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Community of Interest Methodology
and Public Testimony
Karin Mac Donald* and Bruce E. Cain**
In an effort to insulate the redistricting process from legislative
influence, California’s voters approved Propositions 11 and 20, giving the
Independent Citizen Commission the task of drawing the district
boundaries for the Congress, the State Assembly, the State Senate, and
Board of Equalization. The California Citizens Redistricting
Commission proactively sought public input, asking Californians to tell
them about the economic and social interests that bound their community
together, where their community was located, and why it should be kept
together in the interest of fair and effective representation. The language of
article XXI, section 2 of the California Constitution was explicit with
respect to the priority of neutral criteria: respect for the “geographic
integrity” of any “local neighborhood” or “local community of interest” as
well as city and county borders was listed fourth, right after the federal
criteria of equal population, Voting Rights Act compliance, and
geographic continuity. This Article evaluates the value of this approach
and makes recommendations to improve the ways in which public input is
solicited and utilized in the redistricting process. The central arguments are
that: (1) purely quantitative and objective data approaches cannot
substitute for qualitative testimony, (2) the amount of public input can be
staggering and requires considerable efforts to process, and (3) community
of interest considerations still have to be traded off with other redistricting
criteria.
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INTRODUCTION
The novelties of any redistricting cycle can take many forms—shifts in
judicial doctrine,1 evolving political conditions,2 technical refinements,3 or
institutional innovations.4 Sometimes what seems new is actually old, only
repackaged or embedded in a different political or institutional context. In the
2011 redistricting cycle, traditional formal criteria—such as respect for local
community boundaries, compactness, and community of interest considerations—
gained new prominence as a consequence of two important institutional
developments: the evolution of increasingly independent redistricting
commissions (IRCs) and the expanding role of public testimony.
The connection between these two developments and the new emphasis on
communities of interest (COIs) and public testimony is not merely coincidental.
1. Given the Supreme Court’s reputation for following precedent, it is remarkable that the
various phases of modern American redistricting are more marked by sharp shifts in judicial doctrine
than any sudden change in political conditions. Court decisions have dictated the frequency of
redistricting, Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 197–98 (1962), the permissible structure of state
bicameralism, Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964), and the standards for determining racial
discriminatory effects, Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 58–61 (1986). Sometimes the Court’s
decisions have cut off trends, as in the Shaw line of cases. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 630–31 (1993)
(holding that electoral redistricting based on race must pass strict scrutiny); see also Hunt v. Cromartie,
526 U.S. 541, 541–42 (1999) (holding that there was insufficient evidence of racial motive behind
North Carolina’s congressional redistricting plan for the district court to have granted summary
judgment); Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74 (1997) (finding that Georgia redistricting plan did not
violate the Equal Protection Clause); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 954–55 (1996) (holding that a Texas
redistricting plan failed strict scrutiny); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S.
900, 900–02 (1995) (applying the Court’s holding in Shaw to find a redistricting policy in Georgia
unconstitutional). We covered the historical phases of redistricting trends in Bruce E. Cain, Karin
Mac Donald & Michael McDonald, From the Last Generation of Reform to the Next, in DEMOCRACY IN
THE STATES: EXPERIMENTS IN ELECTION REFORM 199, 199–209 (Bruce E. Cain, Todd Donovan &
Caroline Tolbert eds., 2008).
2. Bipartisan gerrymanders were regarded more favorably in the less partisan 1970s than they
have become in the current period of high polarization and frequent divided government. For an
example of how courts viewed gerrymandering in state legislative districts during the less partisan era,
see Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 752–54 (1973).
3. See Micah Altman, Karin Mac Donald & Michael McDonald, From Crayons to Computers: The
Evolution of Computer Use in Redistricting, 23 SOC. SCI. COMPUTER REV. 334, 335 (2005).
4. See Bruce E. Cain, Redistricting Commissions: A Better Political Buffer?, 121 YALE L.J. 1808,
1812–13 (2012) (analyzing the effectiveness of independent redistricting commissions as institutional
reform).
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The central premise of the IRC model is that incumbent influence over the
redrawing of district lines is an inherent conflict of interest that must be
eliminated to the greatest degree possible in order to achieve a fair and neutral
process.5 Given that a finite number of commission members cannot possibly
reflect all the nuanced, varied interests that arise in a large state redistricting, public
input is critical to providing line-drawing guidance. In particular, the California
Citizens Redistricting Commission (CRC, or the Commission), took unprecedented steps to become publicly transparent and to solicit residents’ written and
in-person testimony.6 While their efforts were largely well received, a few critics
have raised questions about the CRC approach. Some allege that the testimony
that the CRC heard was stacked by a coordinated political effort and biased
towards liberal and Democratic interests.7 Others have argued that objective
approaches to determining community of interest should be given more play.8
In the following sections of this Article, we will assess the role of public
testimony and COI approaches to make three points. First, purely quantitative
measures of community of interest cannot supplant qualitative public testimony.
Aside from the various problems associated with creating accurate measures and
turning them into quantitative standards, public testimony gives a better snapshot
of what matters to voters, residents, and communities at a given time and place. If
the goal is to reflect public interests and not merely to constrain line drawing in
some seemingly neutral manner, public testimony is critical. Second, public
testimony can easily overwhelm the redistricting process and sometimes provides
conflicting interpretations. A sincere and earnest effort to determine the public’s
interests in redistricting requires finding ways to process large amounts of
information rapidly, examining the feasibility of competing proposals, and
managing public expectations about the ability to satisfy everyone’s demands.
Lastly, community of interest considerations, however they are determined, must
be traded off with other criteria. The more specific the ordering of criteria set out
in state constitutions and laws, the easier the guidelines for commissioners to
follow.

5. Id. at 1817–21.
6. Id. at 1826–27.
7. See Olga Pierce & Jeff Larson, How Democrats Fooled California’s Redistricting Commission,
PROPUBLICA (Dec. 21, 2011), http://www.propublica.org/article/how-democrats-fooled-californiasredistricting-commission.
8. The foremost proponent of this is Nicholas Stephanopoulos, who has argued for objective
community of interest standards in a trilogy of articles. See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Communities
and the California Commission, 23 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 281, 284–89 (2012) [hereinafter
Stephanopoulos, Communities and the California Commission]; Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Redistricting
and the Territorial Community, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1379, 1385–86 (2012) [hereinafter Stephanopoulos,
Redistricting and the Territorial Community]; Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Spatial Diversity, 125 HARV. L.
REV. 1903, 1949 n.217 (2012).
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I. OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE APPROACHES TO COMMUNITIES OF INTEREST
Redistricting standards fall into two basic types: (1) formal criteria focuses
largely on the shape, size, racial, and socioeconomic composition of the districts
and (2) fairness outcome measures such as proportionality and seats-vote
symmetry.9 The case for formal criteria has always been made on two levels: their
intrinsic worth and their indirect value in constraining efforts to draw lines that
intentionally and unfairly favor one party or group over others. Some formal
criteria are easily measured and relatively uncontroversial—for example, that
district boundaries must be contiguous (connected at all points) and have equal
populations.10 By comparison, COI considerations—the expectation that districts
be composed of “cognizable” common interests—are harder to identify a priori
because there is a subjective component to the interests and boundaries of a given
COI. The “interest” in a COI is not merely a clustering of some measurable social
or economic characteristic. Residents in that area have to perceive and
acknowledge that a social, cultural, or economic interest is politically relevant. COI
geography is ultimately subjective as well. The boundaries of an interest
“community” do not usually coincide neatly with government jurisdictions or
follow fixed, uniform patterns. Even advocates of better quantitative COI
measures concede that perception matters with respect to identifying COIs.11
A. Communities of Interest
The idea that communities of interest matter in a good redistricting process
is certainly not novel. COIs have been part of the mix in scholarly redistricting
discussions for decades.12 COIs are recognized in five state constitutions and
seven other state statutes.13 COIs have also long been important in local
government redistricting.14 In California, COI was specifically mentioned in the
Master’s reports in 1973 and 1991:
9. There was a vigorous debate over the merits of formal criteria in the 1980s. See, e.g., Bruce
E. Cain, Simple vs. Complex Criteria for Partisan Gerrymandering: A Comment on Niemi and Grofman, 33
UCLA L. REV. 213, 214–16 (1985); Bernard Grofman, Criteria for Districting: A Social Science Perspective,
33 UCLA L. REV. 77, 79–93 (1985); Daniel H. Lowenstein & Jonathan Steinberg, The Quest for
Legislative Districting in the Public Interest: Elusive or Illusory?, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1, 12–35 (1985).
10. Although there has been a vigorous debate over using adjusted versus unadjusted census
data for several decades, the major population-related issue in the last two redistricting cycles centered
more on whether to use VAP or CVAP numbers when accounting for minority populations under
the VRA. Nathaniel Persily, The Law of the Census: How to Count, What to Count, Whom to Count, and
Where to Count Them, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 755, 778 (2011).
11. Stephanopoulos acknowledges that territorial communities have a “third element, a feeling
of communal affiliation” that is “subjective in nature.” Stephanopoulos, Redistricting and the Territorial
Community, supra note 8, at 1430.
12. An early proponent of this approach was geographer Richard Morrill. See, e.g., Richard L.
Morrill, Redistricting, Region and Representation, 6 POL. GEOGRAPHY Q. 241, 251–53 (1987).
13. Stephanopoulos, Redistricting and the Territorial Community, supra note 8, at 1424–25.
14. See Bruce E. Cain & David A. Hopkins, Mapmaking at the Grassroots: The Legal and Political
Issues of Local Redistricting, 1 ELECTION L.J. 515, 527–29 (2002).
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[S]ocial and economic interests common to the population of an area
which are probable subjects of legislative action . . . should be considered
in determining whether the area should be included within or excluded
from a proposed district in order that all of the citizens of the district
might be represented reasonably, fairly and effectively.15
The Masters wording reveals very clearly that community of interest has
always been a territorial concept (i.e., a defined area with certain common
economic, social, or cultural interests).16
The rationale for COI-based districts derives implicitly from a delegate view
of representation. In the delegate conception, the representative’s job is to
advocate for the majority interests and preferences of constituents residing within
the boundaries of a given district or territorial jurisdiction. In the trustee version,
the representative makes a best judgment about a policy’s merits and in the virtual
representation model, the representative advocates for supra-territorial interests
such as a political parties, classes, or organizations. District composition matters
little for the trustee or virtual models, but potentially a great deal in the delegate
case. It is easier for representatives to advocate for constituents who have widely
shared attributes and a greater sense of kinship.
On the voter side, COIs can facilitate grassroots electoral coordination and
encourage higher levels of civic involvement and participation when they coincide
with local networks.17 Whatever the advantages of COI, it is important to realize
that it is linked to a particular form of democratic representation (i.e., the
representative as delegate), not to a core democratic concept. For this reason, it is
more appropriately a matter for state regulation, not constitutional doctrine.
Apart from its intrinsic merits, the community of interest approach also
indirectly limits line drawers’ discretion to skew the lines in favor of particular
groups, incumbents, or parties. Limiting options to those with plausible COI
rationale, some believe, is the best way to achieve a fair redistricting plan, or at

15. Legislature v. Reinecke, 516 P.2d 6, 16 (Cal. 1973).
16. In distinguishing his terminology of territorial community from COI, Stephanopoulos
states:
I [prefer] the term “territorial community” instead of the more common “community of
interest” because of certain connotations that the latter phrase has acquired. For one thing,
a community of interest does not have to be spatially bounded, meaning that it coexists
uneasily with the American system of geographic districting. In addition, a community of
interest can be deemed to arise on the basis of any common concern, making the term
notably imprecise and malleable. With its strong geographic valence and emphasis on the
full array of interests and affiliations that people share, the concept of a territorial
community seems substantially more determinate.
Stephanopoulos, Redistricting and the Territorial Community, supra note 8, at 1431–32 (footnote omitted).
The term Stephanopoulos uses, “territorial community,” really refers to the technique of factor
analyzing census and other data to determine COI clusters. As such, it is one specific way of
attempting to determine COI.
17. See Stephanopoulos, Communities and the California Commission, supra note 8, at 288.

614

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 3:609

least, one that minimizes bias significantly.18 In its dual functionality, COI is like
other formal criteria such as compactness and respect for city or county lines.
Since any one of the formal criteria, including COI, can be manipulated under
certain circumstances for party or group benefit, the reform trend has been to
layer as many formal constraints on the process as possible. However, the more
redistricting criteria in play, the more important the trade-off between conflicting
criteria becomes. A sensible answer, adopted in California, is to provide a listing in
order of priority.19 It is unclear whether all the supporters of Propositions 11 and
20 that created the CRC understood the implications of ordering criteria, as some
CRC proponents who wanted more “electoral competition” were apparently later
dismayed at the attention paid to COI testimony.
B. The Emergence of Independent Redistricting Commissions
While the COI concept is not novel, the emergence of independent
redistricting commissions has given it more prominence. IRCs are the culmination
of a reform effort aimed initially at reducing, and more recently at eliminating, the
conflicts of interest that incumbent legislators have when drawing district
boundaries for themselves.20 Commissions vary in their degree of separation from
incumbent legislators and other political officials, but independent citizen
commissions define the far end of the degree of separation continuum.21
IRCs in general are primarily defined by what they are not—entities
controlled by incumbents and politicians—as opposed to what they are supposed
to be. The ambiguity of their role gives rise to different possible interpretations.
One interpretation is that citizen commissioners should act as neutral decision
makers, much as the courts do when they are forced to devise plans as the
redistricting agent of last resort. Courts and court masters do not take extensive
testimony or rely on public definitions of COI. This conception of the impartial
arbiter suggests that the citizen commissioner adheres strictly to constitutional and
statutory guidelines and balances redistricting criteria trade-offs in a neutral,
evenhanded fashion behind the judicial veil of above-the-fray legitimacy. The
legitimacy of this approach hinges on all parties buying into the belief that legal
and professional norms of impartiality will ultimately prevail. In practice, the
losers in judicially imposed redistricting plans often read bias into the final
outcomes.22

18. Morrill, supra note 12, at 248.
19. See CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(d)(1)–2(d)(6).
20. Cain, supra note 4, at 1826–27.
21. Id. at 1818, 1844.
22. Nathaniel Persily notes:
Rarely will everyone involved in redistricting litigation agree that a court-drawn plan is
“fair.” By looking at the partisan data while constructing its plan, however, a court might
be better able to avoid the accusation that its plan is severely biased (in its effects, if not its
intent) against one of the parties.
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Another less frequently practiced variant of the impartiality model is the
neutral tie breaker23—someone who judges between the merits of competing
plans submitted to them or who takes public suggestions and transparently melds
them into a finished map product.24 Here too perceptions matter and losers will
tend to read partisan intent into unfavorable outcomes.
The Arizona and California IRCs however are more amalgamations rather
than exemplars of any one decision-making model. On the one hand,
commissioners were vetted closely (especially in California) for conflict of interest
problems and excessive partisanship, but at the same time there was a conscious
effort to pick commissioners who reflected the state as a whole, implying a
representation model as well. For example, the CRC structure balanced the
numbers of Democrats, Republicans, and Independents on the Commission and
put in place voting rules that required bipartisan agreement. Some commission
advocates hoped that the presence of independents would give the commissions a
perception of more neutrality, at least between the two parties. While critics in
both Arizona25 and California26 questioned the partisan neutrality of the
independent members, for the most part, if not completely neutral, they formed a
centrist bloc that straddled party lines.
The public was encouraged in both California and Arizona to submit plans
for districts or even the entire state, but while the commissioners took public
suggestions seriously, they developed their own ideas and plans. The effects of
submitted statewide plans were primarily indirect. The basic architecture was
developed at the CRC and staff end, but other proposals framed the discussion of
what was possible, particularly submissions by the civil rights groups (due to the
threat of potential litigation). Most of the testimony the CRC received initially
were comments about local COIs, and then later reactions to specific lines
proposed and posted online for public viewing.
C. Public Testimony
Determining COI through public testimony can be expensive and raises
questions about selectivity bias. The CRC set up meetings throughout the state to
hear testimony on what people in different parts of the state thought were the
geographic communities that needed to be kept together (i.e., not divided by a
district boundary) and which surrounding areas had the most common interests.27
Nathaniel Persily, When Judges Carve Democracies: A Primer on Court-Drawn Redistricting Plans, 73 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1131, 1164 (2005).
23. This is the model used in New Jersey’s politician commission system. Mark J. Magyar,
Redistricting Reform in New Jersey 1 (Friends of Local Gov’t Policy Paper Series Vol. 3 No.4, 2011),
available at http://www.njlmef.org/policy-papers/FoLG_v3_4_Magyar.pdf.
24. Id.
25. Cain, supra note 4, at 1831–32.
26. Id. at 1826–27.
27. Stephanopoulos, Communities and the California Commission, supra note 8, at 288–89.
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It is no small logistical matter to transport staff and commission members around
a large state, advertise widely, do outreach to groups and individuals who might
otherwise be under-represented, and then collect and post the material with a
short turnaround time. It is far cheaper to draw lines behind closed doors with
minimal public input.
A common criticism of public testimony is the danger of selectivity bias.
Studies of public testimony generally suggest that the people who show up to
observe and testify at public hearings can be a biased sample of the total
population.28 Inevitably, redistricting hearings attract some types of constituents
more than others. It is a relatively technical subject that precludes many citizens
from participating. Well-organized neighborhoods, civil rights lawyers, and local
political officials will have more knowledge and interest in the proceedings than
the average citizen. Outreach and publicity can improve awareness, but, in the
end, redistricting tends to appeal to the political hard core. It was alleged in
California that the testimony was biased further by an organized attempt to recruit
local activists and party officials to testify before the Commission.29
Whether that was true, it is fair to say that commissioners have to weigh the
source of the information they receive as they evaluate the merits of a particular
COI claim.
The objective position argues that COIs can best be determined by looking
for clusters of census indicators or other data. The most prominent proponent of
this view in recent years is Professor Nicholas Stephanopoulos who in a trilogy of
articles proposes a territorial communities method:
[E]lectoral districts should be required to correspond to underlying
territorial communities. To the extent possible, the boundaries of districts
and organic geographic communities should be required to coincide—
and the courts should be prepared to intervene when communities are
unnecessarily fused, fragmented, or subverted, and the state can offer no
reasonable explanation for the communal disruption.30
The allure of an objective COI approach is clear. The time and money spent
on gathering citizen testimony could be avoided if COIs can be determined by
statistical procedures. Is this hope realistic?
D. Methods of Data Analysis
The method of territorial community relies on a statistical procedure called
factor analysis—a statistical algorithm that identifies clusters of data indicators
that are assumed to be generated by underlying unmeasured variables—in this
28. See, for instance, Kevin M. Leyden, Interest Group Testimony and Resources at Congressional
Hearings, 20 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 431, 435–37 (1995), for evidence that groups with resources tend to
appear more often at public hearings.
29. See Pierce & Larson, supra note 7.
30. Stephanopoulos, Redistricting and the Territorial Community, supra note 8, at 1384–85.
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case, territorial communities.31 For his study of California, Professor
Stephanopoulos uses both the Census Bureau’s American Community Survey
(ACS) and a second data set of votes on statewide popular initiative measures.32
With the ACS data, he found that “the factor with the greatest explanatory power
is a joint measure of socioeconomic status and Hispanic ethnicity” that
distinguished tracts of “wealthy, well-educated, white professionals” from tracts
with “poorer, less educated Hispanics working in blue-collar fields.”33 The other
factors, in order, were marital status, race, sprawl, and age.34 With the initiative
data, the factors he discovered were fiscal policy preferences, socio-cultural issues,
and Native American gaming. Stephanopoulos defines his measure of district
homogeneity as the standard deviation of the census tracts’ scores weighted by the
variance explained by each factor.35
The basic intuition of this territorial communities approach can be described
simply. COIs are clusters of objective indicators. Good districts are composed of
similar census tracts as identified by the factor measures (i.e., deviate the least in
their scores). The greater the homogeneity of various tracts in a district, the better
the redistricting design. The territorial community vision of representation is firstorder homogeneity offset by second-order heterogeneity: demographically similar
people are grouped together into districts but with wide variation across districts
in the types of interests represented.36 In general, there is nothing wrong with this
view of representation. However, the relevant question is not its legitimacy but
whether it should be mandated as the baseline standard by state or federal courts.
In terms of its inherent merits, homogeneous districts are not clearly
superior or intrinsically more democratic than heterogeneous districts. Indeed this
question parallels the issues of perspective in the at large versus single member
district system debate. The U.S. Progressive movement in the early twentieth
century moved to at large districts to weaken neighborhood parochialism and
machine politics and to incentivize a jurisdiction wide perspective. Mandating or
even legally prioritizing homogeneous districts would preclude any future efforts
to balance parochial area with jurisdiction-wide perspectives. Proponents of more
competition in U.S. politics would also lose a potential tool. While competitive
seats can be socioeconomically homogeneous, it is more common to make a seat
competitive by blending different types of constituents. If a territorial community
approach were adopted as a judicial standard, it would preclude other equally valid
approaches to electoral design.

31. See HARRY H. HARMAN, MODERN FACTOR ANALYSIS 3–6 (3d rev. ed. 1976).
32. Stephanopoulos, Communities and the California Commission, supra note 8, at 289–90. This
violates the CRC pledge to ignore political data. Pierce & Larson, supra note 7.
33. Stephanopoulos, Communities and the California Commission, supra note 8, at 291.
34. Id. at 290.
35. Id. at 291.
36. Id. at 283, 289–93.
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In addition, just because people share census attributes does not mean they
perceive political commonality. Political agendas can shift rapidly between
elections or slowly over time from economic issues to social issues: being a
homeowner might be more important in one election, but being a Catholic may
matter in another. Census data are not collected for the purpose of tracking
current policy concerns. Imputing political importance to variables chosen for the
purpose of demographic accounting can be misleading, which is perhaps why
Stephanopoulos experimented with his initiative data.37 Still, there is no escaping
the selection bias problem. The initiative data set is likely skewed towards issues
that could not be resolved in the legislature or that were able to attract enough
resources to qualify for the ballot. Implying political identity from objective data is
problematic unless the real goal is not better representation per se but to prevent
gerrymandering.
So perhaps the real purpose is gerrymander prevention. That is to say, the
real justification of this approach might be to lock in a district building
methodology that makes intentional bias more difficult. But is the territorial
community method easier to use, less vulnerable to potential manipulation and
more likely to produce “fair results”? Stephanopoulos cites evidence that suggests
this might be so, but since none of these studies used his territorial community
method and traditional COI criteria are often used in conjunction with other
formal criteria, it is hard to say for sure.38 In our experience, there is no foolproof
way to eliminate bias and manipulation. Some formal redistricting criteria are
better for certain groups than others. Compactness rewards ghettoized groups
more than dispersed ones. City and county lines help local government officials
who want to move up the electoral pecking order. Communities of interest sorted
on income and race might be more protective of Hispanics than some Asian
groups.
Skillful line drawers can operate effectively within formal constraints to
achieve their goals even if some options are taken off the table by the existence of
formal constraints. When Karcher v. Daggett ushered in the norm of zero population
deviation congressional districts,39 the effect on partisan and racial bias was
minimal.40 Similarly, compact lines and respect for local jurisdiction lines do not
eliminate biases and differential effects completely. Bear in mind that these other
formal criteria are more simply measured than territorial communities. Technical
complexity can open the door to more manipulation. Factor scores can be
weighted differently or computed using different combinations of variables. State
or regional scores might vary from national ones. Similarity scores in general

37. Id. at 283, 290–91.
38. Stephanopoulos, Redistricting and the Territorial Community, supra note 8, at 1422, 1444–46.
39. Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 765 (1983).
40. Burt Neuborne, Felix Frankfurter’s Revenge: An Accidental Democracy Built by Judges, 35 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 602, 629–31 (2011).
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suffer from scale discrepancies: similarities that appear at one measurement level
can differ from those at another.41
In the end, for all these reasons, objective COI approaches such as the
territorial community method are at best supplements to public testimony,
certainly not a substitute. There is a tendency in the redistricting field to fetishize
measures. Given the many criteria that apply to redistricting, the line-drawing
process is inevitably a balancing act between competing values and criteria.
Measures such as seat-vote curves, compactness scores, city and county split
reports, or even objective COI scores can be useful tools for monitoring the
effects that different options produce. The problem arises when measures are
turned into standards. The temptation is to think that any one measure can be the
ultimate standard of fairness that encompasses all the other concerns. The reality
is the trade-offs have to be decided at some point: early if the criteria are ordered
by law or later if done by bargaining among members of a redistricting entity.
E. The American Community Survey Used as Redistricting Data
Leaving aside for the moment the question of Stephanopoulos’s specific
territorial method, there is the equally important question of the data that the
CRC, or indeed any citizen commission, could have used to prepare itself for
drawing district boundaries in 2011. The ACS was ostensibly a logical choice, but
closer examination reveals several problems with using ACS data for redistricting
purposes such as incompatible units of analysis, outdated data, and limited
variable availability. We begin with a little background about the ACS.
After the census of 2000 finished its data collection, the long form that had
been sent out to one out of every six households was discontinued, and questions
that had previously been asked on that form were moved to a new instrument: the
American Community Survey, or ACS.42 Data collected by the ACS include social,
economic, housing, and demographic variables.43 The ACS was fully implemented
in 2005 and now employs a rolling sample of about 2.9 million households per
year, as compared to the once per decade sample that received the census long
form.44
The general idea of moving from the long form to the ACS was well received
by the census data user community. Now rather than a once per decade data
41.

See S. Openshaw, Ecological Fallacies and the Analysis of Areal Census Data, 16 ENVIRONMEN-

TAL AND PLANNING A 17 (1984).
42. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, A
COMMUNITY SURVEY DATA: WHAT

COMPASS FOR UNDERSTANDING AND USING AMERICAN
GENERAL USERS NEED TO KNOW 1 (2008), available at
http://www.census.gov/acs/www/Downloads/handbooks/ACSGeneralHandbook.pdf.
43. Id.
44. Initial Addresses and Sample Selected and Final Interviews, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AM. CMTY.
SURVEY, http://www.census.gov/acs/www/methodology/sample_size_data (last visited May 30,
2013). Between 2000 and 2004, the annual sample size was considerably smaller with 742,209–
890,698 housing units selected. Id.
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collection effort that would result in quickly outdated data, especially toward the
end of the decade, the ACS would be able to release updated and more current
data sets annually prior to the release of the next scheduled census of 2010.45 In
theory, this would give the line-drawing community a forewarning of what they
would be facing when the PL94-171 data were finally released, initiating the start
of redistricting activities.
The redistricting community looked at this data collection policy change with
skeptical curiosity; the Census Bureau had never before been able to produce any
data other than population and racial counts in time for line drawing,46 but with
the shifts in legal doctrine that seemingly discouraged the exclusive reliance on
race and ethnicity,47 there was greater interest than in the past in additional
nonracial data that could be used to guide the construction of districts on all
levels. Skepticism increased when the census bureau posted the ACS units of
analysis and the data ranges that would be released in time for redistricting.
Line drawing for most jurisdictions begins as soon as the Census Bureau
releases the PL94-171 short form block level data in the spring of the year ending
with “one.”48 In the spring of 2011, the only data available from the ACS were the
2005–2009 five-year tract level sample (and for some variables on the block group
level as well), a 2007–2009 three-year sample for populations of 20,000 and above,
and a 2009 one-year sample that was available for populations of 65,000 and
above.49 The first data set, while reasonably up to date, was problematic with
respect to geography. The second and third data sets could not be used due to
their inadequate coverage and large unit of analysis. Leaving aside the challenge of
describing communities of interest and neighborhoods accurately, the extreme
accuracy required by the population deviation standards for congressional districts
necessitates the use of block level data.50 But the smallest unit of analysis on which
the ACS is released is the block group level, and some variables were available on
the census tract level only.51 Moreover, because the ACS relies on a rolling sample

45. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 42, at 3–4.
46. During previous redistricting cycles, only the PL94-171 data were available for line
drawing. The socioeconomic variables from the long form were typically not released until the year
ending with “three,” thus making them available for litigation but not for the construction of districts.
47. See cases cited supra n.1 (beginning with Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993)). The PL94171 data, which is the result of the census short form that every household receives in the decennial
census, only collects total population, voting age, race, ethnicity, and housing units. This dataset is
used to construct lines. The P.L. 94-171 Summary File and Race and Ethnicity Variables, THE
REDISTRICTING GRP. AT BERKELEY LAW, http://redistrictinggroup.org/redistricting/data-sourcesand-variables/race-and-ethnicity-variables/the-p-l-94-171-summary-file-and-race-and-ethnicityvariables (last visited May 30, 2013).
48. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, DESIGNING P.L. 94-171 REDISTRICTING DATA FOR THE YEAR
2010 CENSUS 6–7 (2004), available at http://www.census.gov/rdo/pdf/DesignPL94-171.pdf.
49. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 42, at 3 tbl. 2.
50. See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7 (1964).
51. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 42, at 3, A-2.
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rather than a 100% count like the short form,52 there are some data suppression
issues, especially for very small population subgroups. This means in practice that
for some variables, the data set will show zero population in some tracts and block
groups when in fact there is population there.
A second problem with using the ACS in the 2011 California redistricting is
related to outdated information in the sample. This is best illustrated by the
Citizen Voting Age Population (CVAP) variable, an increasingly crucial piece of
data for evaluating section 5 and section 2 of the Voting Rights Act compliance.53
Respondents surveyed in any of the five years of the ACS sample effectively do
not age in the data set: that is, a person who was seventeen years old when she
responded in 2005 would still be reported at that age at the time of the data release
in 2010. This is potentially problematic for relatively younger groups such as
Latino and Asian populations as their Voting Age Population (VAP) numbers will
be underestimated by this data set due to the “lack-of-aging” sampling feature.54
For California, this presented a particular challenge because of the presence
of Voting Rights Act (VRA) section 2 seats that needed, since Bartlett v.
Strickland,55 to be drawn with a minimum of fifty percent of the Citizen Voting
Age Population. But it was also problematic for COI Assessment in 2011 because
much of the data in the five-year, 2005–2009, dataset were based on information
that had become outdated by rapidly changing conditions. Consider the fact that
in 2005, real estate in California was booming, buyers were purchasing properties
at the top of the market and moving to newly developed suburbs, leaving their
rentals in urban areas behind. Unemployment figures in mid-June were at 5.4%
and business, including the technology industry was doing well. But, five years
later, in June of 2009, California’s unemployment was at 11.5%,56 the foreclosure
crisis was in full swing making many homeowners renters again, and the economy
had tanked!57 The underlying assumption of an objective indicator COI approach
to redistricting is the existence of some level of history and stability during the
duration of the proposed new district’s term; therefore, in order to be a
community of interest, there has to be some shared past that will continue into the
future. There also has to be the presence of common, stable denominators of that
52. Id. at 3.
53. CAL. CITIZENS REDISTRICTING COMM’N, FINAL REPORT ON 2011 REDISTRICTING
14–15 (Aug. 15, 2011), http://wedrawthelines.ca.gov/downloads/meeting_handouts_082011/crc
_20110815_2final_report.pdf.
54. The problems with the ACS CVAP data are discussed in detail in JORGE CHAPA ET AL.,
THE CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN INST. ON LAW AND SOC. POLICY, ESTIMATING CITIZEN
VOTING AGE POPULATION 5–9 (2011), available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Redistricting
_PolicyBrief4_forWeb.pdf.
55. Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 1 (2009).
56. Local Area Unemployment Statistics, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
http://data.bls.gov/timeseries/lasst06000003 (last visited May 30, 2013).
57. Foreclosure Activity Increases 81 Percent in 2008, REALTYTRAC (Jan. 15, 2009), http://www
.realtytrac.com/content/press-releases/foreclosure-activity-increases-81-percent-in-2008-4551.
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interest that are described accurately at the appropriate geographic unit. The kind
of volatility California experienced in the period leading up to the 2011
redistricting made the ACS unusable for that reason and purpose.
The third ACS issue is the weak correspondence between the ACS variables
and the way residents perceive and define their COIs and neighborhoods. Using
ACS variables for COI definition is essentially a top-down approach that
presumes the definition of a community of interest or neighborhood.58
Aggregated income or economic data do not necessarily translate into the
perceived collective interests of a group, community, or neighborhood. Table 1
contains an analysis of 12,425 records of written input to the Commission and
shows that none of the most frequently mentioned COI themes59 were found in
the ACS data.60
As discussed earlier, Stephanopoulos attempts to remedy the weakness of
ACS data by supplementing it with voting results on initiative measures.61
However, California’s Proposition 11 specifically prohibits the use of certain types
of political data in the definition of communities of interest,62 including
relationships with political parties. Frequently, voting on initiatives is a proxy for
party identification in California. For example, voting for Proposition 8, the
elimination of same-sex marriage initiative, showed that Democrats were more
likely to be opposed than Republicans63 and that counties with higher Democratic
voter registration voted in higher numbers against the measure.64 The California
Citizens Redistricting Commission decided early on to broaden the letter of the
law and not use any political data unless required for VRA assessment purposes.65
Clearly, this aspect of Stephanopoulos’s territorial communities method could not
have been used by this Commission.

58. In redistricting hearings, neighborhoods are sometimes described by residents as identical
to communities of interest, i.e. they can share the same boundaries. See Stephanopoulos, Communities
and the California Commission, supra note 8, at 283.
59. The counts in Table 1 are approximate. They are compiled by counting the terms listed in
three coded categories: “Economic community of interest,” “Social community of interest,” and
“Reason for staying together.” There are some duplicates among the categories and the categories
themselves may not be mutually exclusive. For further explanations of the data used in Table 1, see
CAL. CITIZENS REDISTRICTING COMM’N, supra note 53, at 4–5.
60. For explanations of variables and definitions of terms in the 2009 ACS, see generally, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, AM. CMTY. SURVEY: SURVEY METHODOLOGY MAIN http://www.census.gov/
acs/www/methodology/methodology_main (last visited May 30, 2013).
61. See supra Part D.
62. “Communities of interest shall not include relationships with political parties, incumbents,
or political candidates.” CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(d)(4).
63. Exit Polls, CNN.COM, http://edition.cnn.com/ELECTION/2008/results/polls/#val
=CAI01p1 (last modified Nov. 5, 2008, 2:34 PM).
64. See California Proposition 8: Results, WIKIPEDIA, THE FREE ENCYCLOPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/California_Proposition_8#Results (last visited May 30, 2013)
(“Republicans were more likely to have supported the measure than were Democrats.”).
65. See Stephanopoulos, Communities and the California Commission, supra note 8, at 289 n.51.
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Table 1: Frequency of COI Definitions
Community of Interest Definition

Count

Environmental concerns

495

Common culture/cultural community

440

Recreation

251

Fire danger/services

220

Ethnic community

164

High-tech industry

104

Aerospace industry

97

Religious community

62

Air quality

38

II. ESTABLISHING COMMUNITIES OF INTEREST THROUGH PUBLIC TESTIMONY
California’s implementation of Propositions 11 and 20 has been called an
“experiment in participatory democracy,”66 and with thousands of attendees at
dozens of hearings that the Commission held throughout California, along with
over 20,000 comments that were submitted in writing and more than 2000
comments that were provided in person during hearings, this statement seems to
ring true. But did the CRC in fact pay attention to the public’s requests and
implement them where possible, or was this an empty exercise? We argue that the
California Citizens Redistricting Commission did listen to the testimony, evaluate
it, instruct its consultants to consider it67 when drawing “visualizations,”68 and
used public input extensively during live-line drawing sessions to make decisions
on where lines should go.
The CRC received trainings on redistricting issues from various experts,69

66. CA Redistricting Commission –the New Lottery!, MITCHELL KAPOR FOUND., http://blog.mkf
.org/2010/02/06/ca-redistricting-commission-the-new-lottery (last visited June 29, 2013).
67. See In the Matter of Full Commission Business Meeting, CAL. CITIZENS REDISTRICTING
COMM’N 10 (May 6, 2011), available at http://wedrawthelines.ca.gov/downloads/transcripts/201105/
transcripts_20110506_sana.pdf [hereinafter Full Commission Business Meeting] (recalling line drawing
instructions to consultants).
68. The Commission wanted to make clear to the public that consultants were never drawing
maps without Commission input. When consultants developed potential district options based on
Commission direction but not during a public hearing, the resulting plans were called “visualizations,”
rather than “proposals” or “drafts.” Visualizations: Working Draft, CAL. CITIZENS REDISTRICTING
COMM’N, http://wedrawthelines.ca.gov/visualizations-working-draft.html (last visited June 30, 2013).
69. Experts included Justin Levitt (Loyola Law School), Ana Henderson (Berkeley Law), Hans
Johnson (Public Policy Institute of California), and Karin Mac Donald (Statewide Database, UC
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and the ranked criteria, their interpretation, and their implementation were
covered from different angles.
Many of the groups involved in the drafting of Proposition 11, including the
League of Women Voters and California Common Cause, testified in different
Commission meetings about the importance of hearing directly from California
residents about their communities and also urged the Commission not to
prioritize city and county boundaries over neighborhoods and communities of
interest.70 There was a grave concern among good government groups that
criterion four—which lists cities, counties, neighborhoods, and communities of
interest, and was intended to give the same weight to each—would be
misinterpreted by the Commission and that the simple-to-implement formal
jurisdictional boundaries would be prioritized instead. In California, as well as in
many other states, city and county boundaries in densely populated urban areas
often become blurred to residents, and frequently there is little distinction between
those that live on one side of one street that happen to be in a different
jurisdiction from their neighbors.71 The drafters of Proposition 11 wanted to give
the Commission the flexibility to acknowledge these situations and preserve
communities of interests that cut across formal jurisdictional boundaries. Voting
rights groups such as the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund
(MALDEF) and the Asian Pacific American Legal Center (APALC) in
collaboration with the Coalition of Asian Pacific Americans for Fair Redistricting
(CAPAFR) also urged the Commission repeatedly to pay attention to their
communities’ testimony, and to weigh it highly against other criteria.72 MALDEF,
APALC, and CAPAFR were among the groups that conducted outreach and
training campaigns in the communities they serve.73 While these three groups had
different strategies and resources for outreach, the message to their communities

Berkeley). See, e.g., Full Commission Business Meeting, supra note 67, at 30; (mentioning that “Ms.
Macdonald” wanted a whole day with the Commission for training); In the Matter of Full Commission
Line-Drawing Meeting, Vol. I CAL. CITIZENS REDISTRICTING COMM’N 40 (June 7, 2011), available at
http://wedrawthelines.ca.gov/downloads/transcripts/201106/transcripts_20110607_sacto_vol1.pdf
[hereinafter Full Commission Line-Drawing Meeting, Volume I ].
70. See, e.g., In the Matter of Commission Public Outreach, CAL. CITIZENS REDISTRICTING COMM’N
216 (Feb. 26, 2011), available at http://wedrawthelines.ca.gov/downloads/transcripts/201102/
commissionpublicoutreach_20110226.pdf. In its testimony at the CRC Public Outreach Hearing on
February 26, 2011, the League of Conservation Voters asked the CRC to “please consider communities of people and their common interests, then create districts that represent the best interests of
those communities, of course. Look beyond the existing city and county boundaries . . . .” Id.
71. See Appendix Map A.
72. Press Release, Asian Pacific American Legal Center, Asian American Civil Rights Groups
Oppose Prop. 11 Redistricting Initiative (Sept. 4, 2008), available at http://www.caasf.org/2008/09/
asian-american-civil-rights-groups-oppose-prop-11-redistricting-initiative-joint-press-release.
73. Latinos Needed to Apply to California’s New Citizens Redistricting Commission, MALDEF,
http://maldef.org/voting_rights/public_policy/new_citizens_redistricting_commission (last visited
June 29, 2013).
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was the same: organize, define your community of interest, and tell the
Commission about it so it can be taken into consideration.74
The commissioners discussed the information received during public
meetings and decided on a plan of action for criterion four,75 based on the logic
that had been presented by experts and by good government and voting rights
groups:
1. While census geography could be used to assess where city and county
boundaries are located, it did not contain neighborhood or community of interest
boundaries, thus for those criteria, the CRC would have to find alternative
geographic data sources.76
2. Available census variables were of limited use for the assessment of
communities of interest because those that might be of use were either outdated
or on a unit of analysis that was too large to make a distinction. There were no
other data sources available that defined either neighborhoods77 or communities
of interest for the State of California.
The Commission members decided to fill in the data gaps by asking
Californians to provide the missing information by defining their community of
interest and neighborhood boundaries and submitting them to the CRC for
consideration.78 To make clear what they needed, the commissioners utilized a
“community of interest” explanatory handout developed by Berkeley Law’s
Redistricting Group.79
Later, the Commission developed its own participation handout that briefly
explained the criteria and asked public speakers to comment on specific points.80

74. Asians Urged to Apply for Redistricting Commission, NEW AM. MEDIA, http://newamerica
media.org/2010/02/asians-urged-to-apply-for-redistricting-commission.php (last visited June 29,
2013).
75. “The geographic integrity of any city, county, city and county, local neighborhood, or local
community of interest shall be respected in a manner that minimizes their division to the extent
possible without violating the requirements of any of the preceding subdivisions.” CAL. CONST.
art. XXI, § 2(d)(4).
76. Full Commission Business Meeting, supra note 67, at 10–11.
77. The CRC attempted to collect “official” neighborhood boundaries for jurisdictions where
such boundaries were available, including Los Angeles and San Francisco. These boundaries were
heavily debated and modified during line drawing. For San Francisco, for example, different sets of
official boundaries were located from different city departments and a decision had to be made about
which ones to adopt. Changes to the adopted boundaries were made based on public input. See In the
Matter of Commission Public Outreach, CAL. CITIZENS REDISTRICTING COMM’N 52 (Feb. 26, 2011),
http://wedrawthelines.ca.gov/downloads/transcripts/201102/commissionpublicoutreach_20110226.
pdf (transcribing Steven A. Ochoa’s comments on the need for “maps and descriptive written
information” in line drawing).
78. Full Commission Business Meeting, supra note 67, at 26.
79. See California Redistricting Criterion: Communities of Interest (COI), THE REDISTRICTING GRP.
AT BERKELEY LAW, http://redistrictinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/Communities-of
-Interest_2pagehandout_byTRGBL.pdf.
80. The Commission’s worksheet had space for speakers to fill in the criteria that defined their
communities of interest. See CAL. CITIZENS REDISTRICTING COMM’N, PUBLIC INPUT HEARINGS,
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Commissioners also gave verbal explanations at the beginning of the initial set of
public input hearings to make sure that participants’ testimony would render
usable information.81 Both the handouts and the verbal explanations made it clear
that the Commission wanted to know (a) geographic boundaries for the
neighborhood or community of interest; (b) the community’s interests, (i.e.,
variables that defined it within the law); and (c) why it should be kept together
(i.e., relevance of the community of interest for the redistricting).82
The CRC received hundreds of verbal descriptions of communities of
interest and neighborhoods83 and thousands of written submissions with detailed
descriptions. Many public speakers provided hard copy maps along with their
testimony that outlined the boundaries in question. Some speakers were the only
voice for their community while others had organized groups of speakers84 that
came forward to make similar points. In some meetings, multiple residents from
adjacent communities that had not communicated beforehand, or even knew each
other, testified in agreement that their communities were a COI.85
The Commission’s technical consultant had one team member in each
meeting who summarized each public comment into a spreadsheet. A numbered
code was created for every speaker, and supporting information or exhibits that
were provided by speakers were likewise coded so they could be referenced along
with the respective testimony. The public hearing database was updated at each
input hearing and made available to the commissioners in spreadsheet format and
in PDF format to the public. At the conclusion of the hearings, there were 2365
comments in the public hearing database, and 1385 of them specifically addressed
COIs.86

available at http://wedrawthelines.ca.gov/downloads/meeting_handouts_062011/learnmore_20110614
_worksheet.pdf (asking those surveyed questions such as: “What bonds the community?,” “Where is
your community located?,” and “Why should the community be kept together?”).
81. Full Commission Business Meeting, supra note 67, at 5.
82. Id.
83. For examples of testimony on video transcript, see generally Video Archive: Citizens
Redistricting Commission Meeting Viewer, CAL. CITIZENS REDISTRICTING COMMISSION, http://wedraw
thelines.ca.gov/viewer.html (last modified June 21, 2012).
84. For video of the meeting in Bakersfield on April 14, 2011, see Video: Apr. 14, 2011,
Bakersfield, CAL. CITIZENS REDISTRICTING COMM’N, http://wedrawthelines.ca.gov/video-archive
-april-14-2011.html (showing testimony from multiple members of Asian and Pacific Islander
organizations associated with CAPAFR regarding the Hmong COI).
85. See, e.g., Video: June 19, 2011, San Bernardino, CAL. CITIZENS REDISTRICTING COMM’N,
http://wedrawthelines.ca.gov/video-archive-june-19-2011-san-bernardino.html (containing testimony
from nine residents of the San Bernardino mountain communities of Crestline, Lake Arrowhead,
Cedar Pines Park, and Running Springs, explaining that their small communities are a COI based on
common school district, isolation, fire danger, etc., and requesting that said communities be kept
together, particularly in the assembly and senate districts).
86. The Commission also heard from speakers during open forum at their business meetings.
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Public input was also collected outside of public hearings. The Commission
accepted written input via e-mail, mail, phone, and a web form on the CRC
website.87
E-mailed comments and those that came in through the website were
immediately forwarded to the commissioners’ e-mail accounts. All submissions
were also posted to the website, which required the removal of identifying
information by CRC staff. CRC staff was also tasked with creating unique
identifiers for each submission so that a separate public input database could be
constructed by consultants that would allow for coding of comments and
searching of public input during line-drawing sessions.
Though there were frequent trainings by the redistricting consultants to
ensure accuracy, CRC staff continued to struggle with applying the proper codes
to submissions. CRC staff also had tremendous problems keeping the submissions
organized and getting them to the consultants in a timely manner or at all.
Consultants had to sift through dozens of folders that contained duplicate
submissions, had the wrong file names attached, and were not properly redacted.
Three separate quality control processes by consultants to randomly check the
public input sent to them for coding against what was posted on the website
showed discrepancies. The effort to clean up the public input data set and make it
usable for the Commission took tremendous effort by the entire consulting team,
but, even so, there were still shortcomings.
While the Commission officially reports receiving over 20,000 written
comments,88 the public input database we used for the statistics in this Article only
has 12,425 records. Some of this discrepancy arises from the decision the CRC
made to not have public comments coded after a certain date,89 because the
backlog was too high and because redacting, naming, and coding could not have
been completed during the time the Commission had to construct its final maps.
In the days before the Commission finalized the maps, there were up to 500
written submissions received daily by CRC staff. The commissioners nevertheless
decided to read all submissions after the coding cut-off date in order to be able to
take that input into consideration. It is also likely that Commission staff counted
many duplicate submissions, which then factored into the total,90 and possibly also

87. See Contact Page, CAL. CITIZENS REDISTRICTING COMM’N, http://wedrawthelines.ca.gov/
contact.html (last visited May 30, 2013).
88. For a summary of input collected, see CAL. CITIZENS REDISTRICTING COMM’N, FINAL
REPORT ON 2011 REDISTRICTING 5 (Aug. 15, 2011), http://wedrawthelines.ca.gov/downloads/
meeting_handouts_082011/crc_20110815_2final_report.pdf.
89. Input received by July 25 was coded and is part of the dataset analyzed.
90. For an example of duplicated records, see Public Comments: May 2011, CAL. CITIZENS
REDISTRICTING COMM’N, http://wedrawthelines.ca.gov/public-comments-may-2011.html (last
modified May 31, 2011) (containing two links to comments by user “Distasio”); see also Kathleen P.
Distasio, Public Comment to CRC–May 20th, 2011 Santa Rosa, CA, CAL. CITIZENS REDISTRICTING
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counted public input by speakers during hearings if it was accompanied by a
written transcript of their testimony, as separate written public input.
A preliminary analysis of the 12,425 records analyzed shows that 7138
specifically address communities of interest. Many more imply COI but are not
explicit. At least 4237 comments outlined economic COI and a minimum of 1792
addressed social COI.91
A. Where Testimony Mattered
Community of interest testimony affected the lines for all district types
throughout California. The Commission took a district-by-district approach in
creating its plans. For each district, commissioners would debate the testimony
they had received and then build the district while complying with higher ranked
criteria.92 We can broadly classify the types of instances in which COI testimony
mattered into several categories: affinities between neighboring communities,
related population growth outside the boundaries of an incorporated city,
discrepancies between neighborhoods and census designations, and interests not
covered by data like ACS.
The first category, affinities between neighboring communities, is well
illustrated by testimony received at the CRC’s Santa Rosa hearing, which revealed
that Marin County residents in large numbers did not want to share a district with
San Francisco.93 The summary of the public hearing comments reads: “Many
Marin residents would like Marin County to be in a district with Sonoma County
and include Santa Rosa if possible. . . .”94 There were many written submissions
that made the same points.95 At subsequent hearings, speakers commented on the
COMM’N (May 22, 2011, 4:12 PM), available at http://wedrawthelines.ca.gov/downloads/public
-comments-201105/public_comment_8marin_20110522_distasio.pdf.
91. This dataset has not been cleaned. Coding asked for a box to be checked for social or
economic COI mentioned, but this was not always done. The actual numbers are likely much higher.
92. CAL. CITIZENS REDISTRICTING COMMISSION, supra note 88, at 7–25.
93. For video transcript of the Santa Rosa hearing, see, Video Archive: May 20, 2011, Santa Rosa,
CAL. CITIZENS REDISTRICTING COMM’N, http://wedrawthelines.ca.gov/video-archive-may-20
-2011-santa-rosa.html.
94. For a summary of public comments and a regional “wrap-up” document, see generally
Region VII, VIII Wrap-up, CAL. CITIZENS REDISTRICTING COMM’N 2 (May 26, 2011), available at
http://wedrawthelines.ca.gov/downloads/meeting_handouts_may2011/handouts_20110527_q2_7_8
.pdf.
95. See, e.g., Joan Caviness, Public Comment on Redistricting of the North Bay, CAL. CITIZENS
REDISTRICTING COMM’N (May 21, 2011, 11:04 PM), available at http://wedrawthelines.ca.gov/
downloads/public-comments-201105/public_comment_8marin_20110521_caviness.pdf;
Distasio,
supra note 90; Kathleen Doyle & Charles Kiene, Public Comment on Proposition 20, CAL. CITIZENS
REDISTRICTING COMM’N (May 22, 2011), available at http://wedrawthelines.ca.gov/downloads/
public-comments-201105/public_comment_8marin_20110522_joint.pdf; Comment from Wendy
Friefeld, Public Comment on Redistricting–Marin and Sonoma Counties, CAL. CITIZENS REDISTRICTING
COMM’N (May 22, 2011, 9:56 PM), available at http://wedrawthelines.ca.gov/downloads/publiccomments-201105/public_comment_8marin_20110522_friefeld.pdf; Nancy & Carleton Prince, Public
Comment on Marin and Sonoma Counties, CAL. CITIZENS REDISTRICTING COMM’N (May 22, 2011 6:06
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rural similarities of the areas, including the presence of dairy farming industries.96
In their numerous written submissions, Marin residents suggested that the area’s
rural and suburban character fostered a family- and outdoor-oriented lifestyle that
shared similar concerns about watersheds and the 101 freeway.97 There was also
written testimony about the similarities of the small cities of Petaluma and
Cotati.98
The resulting assembly district is described by the Commission as follows in
its final report:
AD 10 consists of the entire county of Marin and extends north to
include communities in southern Sonoma County including part of Santa
Rosa to achieve population equality. It keeps whole the sister cities of
Petaluma, Cotati, and Sebastopol. This district is characterized by
suburban and rural areas including a significant dairy industry.99
Another area in which COI testimony proved influential was in identifying
spillover population that is located outside the boundaries of a city or county but
shares a common interest with that jurisdiction. A good illustration of this is the
population that surrounds the city of Santa Clarita. Map 1 shows population
density in blue dots in and around Santa Clarita.

PM), available at http://wedrawthelines.ca.gov/downloads/public-comments-201105/public_comment
_8marin_20110522_prince.pdf; Barbara Raeuberto, Redistricting Comments, CAL. CITIZENS
REDISTRICTING COMM’N (May 22, 2011, 1:43 PM), available at http://wedrawthelines.ca.gov/
downloads/public-comments-201105/public_comment_8marin_20110522_raeuber.pdf.
96. See, e.g., Video: Feed One from June 27, 2011 Public Input Hearing, CAL. CITIZENS REDISTRICTING COMM’N, http://wedrawthelines.ca.gov/video-archive-june-27-2011-san-francisco.html.
97. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
98. See Heidi Rhymes, Public Comment: Redistricting for Petaluma, CAL. CITIZENS REDISTRICTING
COMM’N (May 22, 2011 6:20 PM), available at http://wedrawthelines.ca.gov/downloads/publiccomments-201105/public_comment_8sonoma_20110522_rhymes.pdf (“Petaluma is far more a part
of [Sonoma County] than of Marin . . . . ”).
99. CAL. CITIZENS REDISTRICTING COMM’N, supra note 88, at 29–30.
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Map 1: Population Density in Santa Clarita and Surrounding Area

The city had a significant population density surrounding its official
boundary, most notably along its northern and southeastern boundaries. At the
Antelope Valley and San Fernando hearings, the Commission received testimony
from Santa Clarita residents requesting the inclusion of these areas within a district
with Santa Clarita. They testified that these unincorporated county residents
attend the same schools, work and go to church in similar places, and shop in
Santa Clarita. Moreover, they said it was very likely that the city would annex these
areas in the near future. Testimony also indicated that there were new housing
developments planned in unincorporated county adjacent to the city.
Another aspect of COI testimony is ascertaining where neighborhoods differ
from census units. Clearly, if a neighborhood does not follow block group or tract
lines, the census unit based information from the ACS will be mismatched with
COI perceptions. Such was clearly the case in San Francisco, as shown in Map 2.
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Map 2: Census Units and Neighborhood Divisions in San Francisco

Neighborhoods matter a lot in San Francisco’s politics at almost every level.
But at least forty-nine of San Francisco’s 176 census tracts are split by the city’s
neighborhoods. Once again, a statistical procedure aggregating areas based on
census tracts would not be able to capture those neighborhood units.
Finally, there are parts of California where the socioeconomic profile is
either irrelevant or so invariant that ACS information is basically unhelpful. Map 3
shows the Hollywood-Beverly Hills and southern San Fernando Valley (Tarzana,
Encino, Sherman Oaks, and Studio City) areas.
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Map 3: Hollywood-Beverly Hills and Southern San Fernando Valley Areas

Judging from the map it is a consistently well-to-do area. But the CRC
received overwhelming testimony regarding the distinction between communities
and their interests in the San Fernando Valley as opposed to the Los Angeles
Basin communities. The two COIs are geographically delineated by the
Mulholland grade/Santa Monica Mountains. On the northern side of the grade is
the San Fernando Valley and on the southern side of the grade is the Los Angeles
Basin. According to the ACS data, communities on either side of the grade appear
to be demographically and socially similar, but the testimony received by the
Commission during their public input process characterized the Mulholland grade
as the “Great Wall of China” between these Los Angeles regions. Additionally, the
Commission received compelling testimony regarding the fire hazard in the
Hollywood Hills on the Los Angeles Basin side of the grade that does not exist on
the San Fernando Valley side. The fire hazard on the Los Angeles Basin side is
due to the exposure to seasonal Santa Ana winds and does not exist to the same
degree on the San Fernando Valley side of the grade. Due to the extensive issues
around wildfire hazards, fire prevention, and fire services, the communities in the
Hollywood Hills requested that they not be placed in an “over the hill” district
with the San Fernando Valley given their need for a representative dedicated to
assisting them with fire abatement and prevention issues.
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B. The Compatibility of Communities of Interest and Other Formal Criteria
As discussed earlier, communities of interest share the fourth criterion in the
California Constitution with cities, counties, cities and counties, and
neighborhoods.100 In the Commission’s final report, criterion four is referred to as
the “geographic integrity” criterion,101 and all entities listed therein (cities,
counties, COIs, etc.) were ostensibly given the same weight. However, the final
report makes clear that when these geographic criteria were in conflict, the
Commission tipped the balance on the side of the COIs.102
Compactness is the fifth ranked redistricting criterion in the California
Constitution, below population equality, the VRA, contiguity, and geographic
integrity of jurisdictions including communities of interest.103
Compactness is not as easily implemented as it would seem especially when
the preservation of other geographies, such as city boundaries is a higher ranked
criterion. Many California cities are anything but compact; they have strange
shapes, non-city areas within the city, and frequently there are disconnected
outlying areas that are part of the city, that have to be picked up in line drawing to
unify the jurisdiction and that render the shape even less compact.104 In early
hearings, the Commission repeatedly heard from one of its voting rights attorneys
about the importance of compactness, leaving commissioners with the clear
impression that he prioritized compactness over the higher ranked criteria.105 He
linked compactness with contiguity, a higher ranked criterion, and diminished the
importance of communities of interest.106 A joint group of good-government
organizations took issue with this view and urged the Commission to apply the
criteria as they were defined and ranked by the constitution, not its attorneys.107 A
number of sharply worded letters were submitted to the CRC by groups including

100. CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(d)(4).
101. See CAL. CITIZENS REDISTRICTING COMM’N, supra note 88, at 23.
102. Id. at 24 (“When those same-level criteria were in conflict and could not be
simultaneously satisfied, the Commission chose the configuration that best reflected the shared
interests of the community.”).
103. CAL. CONST. art. XXI § 2(d)(5).
104. See, for example, the city boundaries of Fresno and Bakersfield.
105. Full Commission Business Meeting, supra note 67, at 26 (“[ I]f the districts [drawn by the
CRC] . . . look compact and seem to comply with everything, there’s not going to be much advantage
to . . . .trying to challenge the districts or hav[ing] a referendum . . . .”); Full Commission Line-Drawing
Meeting, Volume II: Meeting Before the Cal. Citizens Redistricting Commission, CAL. CITIZENS REDISTRICTING COMM’N 52 (June 7, 2011 1:23 PM), available at http://wedrawthelines.ca.gov/downloads/
transcripts/201106/transcripts_20110607_sacto_vol2.pdf [ hereinafter Full Commission Line-Drawing
Meeting, Volume II ] (“[N]esting is a lower criteria than compactness.”).
106. For a discussion about how compactness presents an issue for a district that is drawn to
combine communities of interest, see Full Commission Line-Drawing Meeting, Volume II, supra note 105,
at 21–22.
107. For testimony by Cressman about VRA attorneys’ presentation about criteria and VRA
attorneys’ false ranking of criteria, see Full Commission Line-Drawing Meeting, Volume I, supra note 69, at
36–37.
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those that were part of the collaborative coalition that drafted the initiative,108
urging the Commission to follow the constitution and educating them about the
VRA attorneys’ misinterpretation of the criteria.109
After hearing repeatedly from these various groups and speakers about the
problems with VRA counsel’s guidance regarding the compactness requirement,
the Commission concluded that the compactness criterion only had to be
considered if it did not conflict with the higher ranked criteria.110 Satisfying all the
higher ranked criteria, especially criterion four in light of the voluminous public
input, was a feat in and of itself; by the time compactness could have been
considered, the lines were for the most part set in place so that little further
modification was possible. However, the early guidance by VRA counsel did leave
its mark on some of the districts in the end. In particular the Anaheim–Santa Ana
senate district, about which there had been voluminous public testimony about the
two cities constituting a community of interest.111 The CRC was advised by its
VRA attorney that it could not combine this community of interest because the
City of Orange separated the two jurisdictions, and thus the lines would not be
compact enough to constitute a community of interest.112 In the end, the two

108. Steven Reyes and Kathay Feng (Executive Director of Common Cause California), two
of the authors of Proposition 11, wrote a letter to the CRC educating the Commission about errors in
VRA counsel’s presentation and materials regarding criteria ranking and application. Letter from
Steven Reyes & Kathay Feng, Exec. Dir., Common Cause Cal., to Cal. Citizens Redistricting Comm’n
4, (June 2, 2011), available at http://wedrawthelines.ca.gov/downloads/public-comments-201106/
public_comment_20110602_4.pdf (discussing “contiguity” and “compactness”).
109. A letter by the African American Redistricting Collaborative summarizes the previously
submitted letters and notes the dates on which they were submitted or read into the public record.
Letter from Afr. Am. Redistricting Collaborative to Cal. Citizens Redistricting Comm’n 2–3 (July 7,
2011), available at http://wedrawthelines.ca.gov/downloads/meeting_handouts_072011/handouts_
20110708_sacto.pdf. Item 5 outlines the concern about the application of compactness with respect
to the application of the Voting Rights Act. Id. at 3.
110. See CAL. CITIZENS REDISTRICTING COMM’N, supra note 88, at 24.
111. For examples of videotaped testimony, see speakers 10, 12, 18, 27, 31, and 55, among
others, testifying in Video Archive: May 6, 2011, Santa Ana Feed Six, CAL. CITIZENS REDISTRICTING
COMM’N, http://wedrawthelines.ca.gov/video-archive-may-6-2011-santa-ana.html (testifying about
keeping Santa Ana and Anaheim together due to their COI).
112. Interestingly, the same attorney referenced past redistricting by the “Special Masters”
frequently and held their maps up as an example that the Commission should strive to achieve. The
Special Masters, however, created a combined Santa Ana and Anaheim district in 1991 by combining
the two cities through Garden Grove explicitly to maximize the Latino population in the districts. The
same architecture was maintained in the 2001 districts. For more information on Assembly District
69, see Report and Recommendations of the Special Masters on Reapportionment, BERKELEY INST. OF
GOVERNMENTAL STUD. (Dec. 9, 1991), http://igs-web.lscrtest.com/library/research/quickhelp/
policy/redistricting/reapp90-report/final-V-A.html. For a district map of Assembly District 69, see
Map of California Assembly District 69, STATEWIDE DATABASE, http://statewidedatabase.org/info/
ad01maps/AD692001.jpg (last visited May 30, 2013). For more information on Senate District 34, see
Report and Recommendations of the Special Masters on Reapportionment, supra. For a district map of Senate
District 34, see Map of California Senate District 34, STATEWIDE DATABASE, http://statewidedatabase
.org/info/sd01maps/SD342001.jpg (last visited May 30, 2013). For information on Congressional
District 46, see Report and Recommendations of the Special Masters on Reapportionment, supra. For a district

2013]

COMMUNITY OF INTEREST METHODOLOGY

635

areas were combined in a VRA section 2 district for the assembly,113 but they were
split, for the most part, in the senate district.114
CONCLUSION
While we reject the idea that objective indicators, especially those derived
from the ACS, are an adequate substitute for public testimony and we endorse the
construction of COIs based on how residents perceive them, we leave open the
possibility that creative and thoughtful quantitative data collection can supplement
a redistricting effort. The problem is the time and expense of adding this task to
the many others already on the shoulders of citizen commissions and their staff. It
is a massive task to collect and organize the plans, COIs, suggestions, and
objections the public submits. But if public participation is to mean anything,
these submissions must be taken seriously. This is by far the most important
challenge for the next round of citizen redistricting. Perhaps, the collection of
relevant data can be crowdsourced, or the onus be placed on those who testify to
present more evidence for their arguments. But we see little or no value in using
outdated and incomplete census tract data to create so-called territorial
communities as a substitute for real COIs.
The temptation to eliminate the political balancing of different interests by
formula or computational methods does not eliminate the political decision: it
simply pre-decides it by the assumptions of the measures. And to make any one
criterion—competitiveness, seat-votes symmetry, or territorial community—the
primary baseline for drawing lines simply fetishizes useful measures and creates
arbitrary standards. It does not eliminate political judgment; it imposes it. If that is
what a community wants to do, then so be it. But it should not be something that
the courts do to the community in the name of political impartiality.

map of Congressional District 46, see Map of California State Congressional District 46, STATEWIDE
DATABASE, http://statewidedatabase.org/info/cd01maps/CD462001.jpg (last visited May 30, 2013).
113. For a description of Assembly District 69, see CAL. CITIZENS REDISTRICTING COMM’N,
supra note 88, at 40.
114. Id. at 50.
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Appendix:
Map A: County Boundaries of Contra Costa and Alameda Along the El
Cerrito (Contra Costa County) and Albany (Alameda County) Borders, City
and Boundary Lines of Emeryville and Berkeley Along the Oakland Border

